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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
subject to prosecution if these duties are ignored." This is the only men-
tion made of the possibility of other stockholders looking to the directors
for payment of their share of the amount recovered. But where an action
was brought by the remaining directors of a Russian insurance corpora-
tion, against a bank which was trustee of a sum deposited with it by the
corporation in accordance with a statute for the benefit of creditors, the
court held that because of the possibility of the defendant's being liable to
the corporation's successors in foreign countries where the decrees of the
Soviet government were recognized, the plaintiffs could not recover. Russian
Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard (1925) 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703. The
former case was distinguished from this one, in that in the first there was a
legal liability, whereas in this case the liability was one enforceable in
equity.
However, a further conjectural issue arises as to what would have been
the status of the plaintiff in the instant case if the United States had recog-
nized Russia at the time of this suit. Perhaps provisions for such situations
would have been made by treaty. But if they were not and a suit were
brought by the remaining directors, the Soviet decree might be disregarded
upon the ground that it operated retroactively in the particular case.
T. L., '32.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY OF CO-EMPLOYEE-SCOPE OF EMPLOY-
MENT.-Plaintiff was engaged in eating her lunch during the lunch hour at
the place of her employment when another employee of the same concern
jerked the chair from under her, causing her to fall. Held, the fellow serv-
ant's act was not in the scope of his employment, nor was there evidence
sufficient to show a ratification by the employer of his conduct, sufficient to
render the employer liable for the injuries sustained. Gess v. Wagner
Electric Mfg. Co. (Mo. 1930) 31 S. W. (2d) 785.
Under the fellow-servant rule a master is not liable for the injuries to a
servant caused by the negligence of a fellow servant engaged in the same
general business where the master has exercised due care in the selection of
his servants. Martin v. Morrison (1929) 32 F. (2d) 400; Encarnacion v.
Jamison (1929) 251 N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422; Walsh v. Eubanks (Ark.
1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 762. The employee is held to have assumed the risks
connected with the employment. But the doctrine does not apply when the
servant has injured his fellow servant in a wilful, malicious, or reckless
manner, provided he has acted in the scope of his employment. Richard v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. (1919) 79 N. H. 380, 109 Atl. 88; Alden Mills v. Pender-
graft (Miss. 1928) 115 So. 713.
The question of the scope of employment must be determined by what
the servant was employed to perform and by what he actually did perform,
rather than by the mere verbal designation of his position. Marshall v.
United Ry8. Co. of St. Louis (Mo. App. 1916) 184 S. W. 159; Brayman v.
Russell & Pugh Lumber Co. (1917) 31 Idaho 140, 169 Pac. 932. Where
some connection with the employment, or a -motive for furthering and act-
ing with reference to it is found, recovery has been allowed. Thus where
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the employee is in the physical act of performing his duties, the fact that
he does them in a reckless, malicious manner, even with an intention to
cause the injury resulting, does not preclude recovery. Hellriegel v. Dun-
ham (1915) 192 Mo. App. 43, 179 S. W. 763; Landers v. Quincy 0. & K. R.
Co. (1908) 134 Mo. App. 80, 114 S. W. 543.
But, as in the principal case, where the wilful, malicious act was entirely
independent and separate, with no apparent connection existing between
the required work and the act resulting in injury, the courts are inclined
to hold that the act did not take place in the scope of the employment.
Pettigrew v. St. Louis Ore & Steel Co. (1883) 14 Mo. App. 441; Ferguson
v. Rex Spinning Go. (1929) 196 N. C. 614, 146 S. E. 597; Merkouros '.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. (1920) 104 Neb. 491, 177 N. W. 822. Thus, put-
ting torpedoes on a track with intent to frighten co-employees is entirely
out of the scope of the employment. Goupiel v. Grand Trunk Ry. Go.
(1920) 94 Vt. 337, 111 Atl. 346. Playing with an air hose and thereby
causing injury is likewise not included. Rivenbark v. Hines (1920) 180
N. C. 240, 104 S. E. 524. Nor is the act of paddling a fellow employee
to initiate him into the service connected in any way with the serious pur-
pose of the employment. Medlin Milling Go. v. Boutwell (1911) 142 Ky.
80, 133 S. W. 1042. Combats among the workmen, resulting in serious
consequences, are not construed to be sufficiently connected with the scope
of employment, even though they arise over disputes concerning the busi-
ness. Great Southern Lumber Co. v. May (1925) 138 Miss. 27, 102 So. 854.
We find no departure by the Missouri Supreme Court from the traditional
course of decisions. The court's strict construction of the scope of the
servant's employment in the principal case is commendable both from the
standpoint of stare decisis and the practical consideration of releasing
innocent employers from the result of human tendencies and propensities
over which they have no control. C. E., '32.
PARENT AND CHILD-DUTY OF SurPoRT OF PARENT-DESTITUTION AS
BASIS.-At common law, a child was under no duty to support an indigent
and needy parent, 46 C. J. 1279. The case of Beutel v. State (1930) 36
Ohio App. 73, 172 N. E. 838 enforces a statutory criminal liability for
failure to support a destitute parent. The fact that other children con-
tributed somewhat toward the destitute parent's support was held not to
release the defendant from the statutory obligation, although the court
specifically mentions the parent's partial destitution and indicates in-
ferentially that such a condition, at least, is a necessary element in the
violation of the child's duty. This case stands as the only reported case
involving criminal liability for such a violation.
In dealing with a similar statutory duty, the majority of courts hold
that it is no defense to a father, charged with failure to support his minor
child, that the child was being cared for capably by others. State v. Waller
(1913) 90 Kan. 829, 136 Pac. 215; People v. Howell (1920) 214 I11. App.
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